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Introduction
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to outline how recent develop-
ments in cooperation theory are so similar to the communication network concept
(McGregor, 1993) that a unified terminology would be useful to facilitate exchange
of ideas. Second, we argue that the communication network concept provides an
evolutionary framework to predict the widespread occurrence of phenomena that
until now have been discussed in the context of highly developed cognitive abili-
ties. This creates a problem: as it stands, there appear to be no words in cooperation
theory that were not developed in the human context and hence do not include
a cognitive component. We have to use definitions that only constitute the func-
tional aspects of phenomena (like tactical deception and indirect reciprocity) and
ignore the mechanistic aspects (i.e. theory of mind, intentionality) that are com-
monly part of the definitions. We kindly ask readers always to keep in mind that
our definitions never imply any specific cognitive abilities. We illustrate our ideas
with data on the mutualism between the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and
its ‘client’ reef fish, which visit cleaners to have ectoparasites removed from their
surface, gills and mouth (reviewed by Losey et al., 1999; Coˆte´, 2000).
Cooperation provides a challenge to evolutionary theory because it often in-
volves apparently altruistic behaviour. Hamilton (1964) provided a framework to
understand why altruism between kin can be evolutionary stable; specifically, an
altruist gains indirect fitness benefits from its action. However, there are plenty of
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examples where recipients of altruistic acts are unrelated to the helping individual
(Dugatkin, 1997). Trivers (1971) pointed out that such altruism might be evolu-
tionarily stable if the recipient later reciprocates, an idea that was formalized
by Axelrod & Hamilton (1981). They used an iterated version of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, a two-player game in which opponents can either cooperate or
defect. Defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation independently of the
partner’s action, but if both players cooperate they receive a higher payoff than
if both defect, hence the dilemma. In a computer tournament in which several
strategies competed with each other, a simple strategy called ‘tit-for-tat’ emerged
as a cooperative solution to the game. Tit-for-tat players start by being cooperative;
then in the next round they play what their opponent did in the previous round.
Thus, tit-for-tat players can reap the benefits of mutual cooperation while avoid-
ing exploitation by an uncooperative opponent (except for the first occasion on
which an opponent defected). Several new strategies that are similar but appar-
ently superior to tit for tat have been tested since the first computer tournament
(reviewed by Dugatkin, 1997).
Despite the intuitive appeal of reciprocal altruism and behavioural strategies
similar to tit for tat to ensure cooperative behaviour, few empirical examples have
been reported and some that have are contentious (Dugatkin, 1997). In addition,
Alexander (1987) pointed out that many examples of human altruistic behaviour
do not fit an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game: humans often help individuals
who are highly unlikely to ever reciprocate. He proposed that humans might help
others simply to increase their own image within the society. Nowak & Sigmund
(1998) explored this idea by developing a game theory model in which direct
reciprocity on altruistic acts was excluded. Instead, an altruist gained an increase
in his image score. If an individual’s image score was linked to the probability that
others were willing to provide help when needed, cooperation readily emerged
and was evolutionarily stable (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). Individuals helped in
order to be helped themselves during future interactions with current bystanders
(for further theoretical developments see Lotem et al. (1999, 2003) and Leimar &
Hammerstein (2001). An experiment with first-year students confirmed a crucial
prediction of the models: students that helped more than average received more
help and, therefore, a final payoff that was above the average (Wedekind & Milinski,
2000). This new approach to the evolution of cooperation is a specific instance of
a communication network: the interactions between individuals do not happen
in a social vacuum but in the presence of other individuals who eavesdrop and
thereby extract relevant information for own future interactions with the actors
(McGregor, 1993). As a consequence of eavesdropping, it pays individuals to alter
their behaviour, either as a general unconditional response (Johnstone, 2001) or
specifically in situations where bystanders are present (audience effects; see Ch. 4).
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Nowak & Sigmund (1998) proposed that altruism based on indirect reciprocity
is a hallmark of human evolution. Although they do not specify why this should
be so, their proposal implies that non-human animals either do not live in so-
cial environments that would favour the evolution of altruism through indirect
reciprocity or lack some of the cognitive abilities required (but see Zahavi, 1995;
Roberts, 1998). In contrast, we suggest that the communication network concept
has the advantage of coming from a purely functional perspective rather than
trying to explain apparently maladapted human behaviour. Early discussions of
communication networks (McGregor, 1993) argued that behaviours such as eaves-
dropping and audience effects should evolve in the context of a network, with-
out detailed consideration of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. By ignoring
mechanisms, we use the communication network concept to predict eavesdrop-
ping and audience effects in potentially cooperative contexts without worrying
about cognitive constraints. Experimental evidence for the existence of eaves-
dropping has been provided for a wide variety of taxa (Ch. 2). Whereas human
subjects can be asked about their behaviour, eavesdropping in other animals has
to be inferred from the eavesdroppers’ subsequent behaviour towards individu-
als observed interacting. Differences in individuals’ roles must elicit differences
in subsequent eavesdropper behaviour towards them. It was thus an implicit as-
sumption of communication-network studies that eavesdroppers attribute some
sort of image score to observed individuals and that this score governs their own
future behaviour towards those individuals. Scoring an individual’s tendency to
help is just one type of image score. Fighting ability, aggressiveness and mating
success with regard to female choice are the image scores typically studied in
communication networks (e.g. Ch. 5).
That eavesdroppers adjust their own behaviour to what they have witnessed has
important implications for the behaviour of individuals that is observed. While a
classical approach would suggest that individuals maximize payoffs in each single
interaction (with the exception of reciprocal altruism and punishment, where ben-
efits are delayed), any occurrence of eavesdropping implies that selection favours
individuals that optimize current actions by integrating both immediate payoffs
and future consequences of their behaviour. Within the framework of coopera-
tion theory, it may pay individuals to be altruistic if this increases the probability
of meeting more cooperative eavesdroppers in the future; in contest theory, it
may pay to be more aggressive in the presence of potential challengers if winning
a fight results in fewer attacks from eavesdroppers. Individuals can respond to
eavesdropping in two ways. First, they can alter their behaviour in any interaction
in relation to the average probability that eavesdroppers are present. In this case,
all individuals behave in the same way (with respect to eavesdroppers) in all inter-
actions. Second, individuals can pay attention to specific cues that eavesdroppers
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are present for a particular interaction and alter their behaviour accordingly. In
the latter, individuals show a flexible behavioural pattern. Communication net-
work models have until now dealt with the first scenario (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Johnstone, 2001; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). There is, however, increasing ev-
idence that animals adjust their behaviour in a particular interaction according
to the presence or absence of eavesdroppers (Doutrelant et al., 2001; Bshary, 2002;
Ch. 4).
Altruism towards unrelated individuals has been linked to positive reciprocity,
be it direct (Trivers, 1971) or indirect (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998): individual help be-
cause they will receive help in return. However, this is not necessarily the case. An
alternative is that an individual helps in order to raise its image and uses its image
to exploit recipients or eavesdroppers, which will behave cooperatively because of
this high image. If all individuals in a population exploited eavesdroppers, then
image scoring would break down. However, as long as image scoring yields an
overall benefit, either because most altruistic acts are honest in that an individ-
ual’s willingness to cooperate is revealed or because the benefits of cooperation
exceed the costs of being exploited, altruism may be used both as an honest and as
a deceptive signal. Therefore, altruism may sometimes serve as a signal out of con-
text, causing other individuals to react in the signaller’s favour and to their own
disadvantage. This is the functional definition of tactical deception (Hauser, 1998).
In communication-network terms, it may pay individuals to be altruistic if this
signal is misinterpreted by eavesdroppers in a way that allows future exploitation
of them.
Such a functional approach to tactical deception is in strong contrast to the
traditional cognitive approach. Though such behaviour has been described, for
example in birds (Munn, 1986), tactical deception is often seen as a hallmark
of primate ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne & Whiten, 1988): the notion that
most primate species have been strongly selected for the cognitive abilities to
cope with their social environment (see references in Byrne & Whiten 1988 and
Ch. 25). The ability to use tactical deception has, therefore, been linked to the
concept of theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978): the ability to speculate
how another individual might perceive a certain situation. However, Heyes (1998)
cautioned that any observations of tactical deception do not imply the existence of
particularly high cognitive abilities. Instead, originally animals might have made
an error (i.e. produced a signal out of context) but it may have had a favourable
outcome for the signaller. As a results the signaller may associate this error with
a reward and consequently would be more likely to produce the signal again in
this context. The notion that simple associative learning might suffice to produce
signals that fit the functional definition of tactical deception offers the possibility
of using a much more functional, rather than mechanistic, approach to the topic
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(see also Hauser, 1998) – and the appropriate framework for the study of tactical
deception is communication networks.
Interactions between cleaner fish and clients
In the remainder of this chapter, we present data on interactions between
the cleaner wrasse and client reef fish to illustrate the arguments outlined above.
Data were collected in the Red Sea, at Ras Mohammed National Park, Egypt. Meth-
ods of data collection are described in detail elsewhere (Bshary, 2001, 2002), so here
we will keep this kind of information to a minimum. All data are field observa-
tions; therefore, experimental proof is still lacking. However, these data illustrate
that it is worthwhile searching for potential examples of positive indirect reci-
procity and tactical deception with a functional perspective rather than worrying
about cognitive constraints.
Clients regularly visit the cleaners at their small territories called ‘cleaning
stations’ (cleaning symbiosis reviewed by Losey et al., 1999; Coˆte´, 2000). As indi-
vidual cleaner wrasse may have more than 2000 interactions per day (Grutter,
1995), interactions often take place in the presence of other potential visitors.
Such bystanders can eavesdrop and evaluate the cleaner’s service quality. While
the cleaner fish eat parasites, in particular gnathiid isopods (Grutter, 1996), they
also feed on client mucus and scales (Randall, 1958; Grutter, 1997). Feeding on
healthy client tissue is correlated with the occurrence of client jolts, an observ-
able short shake of the client’s body, in response to mouth contact by the cleaner
fish (Bshary & Grutter, 2002a). The frequency of client jolts correlates negatively
with parasite load; therefore, client jolts are not a byproduct of parasite removal.
Rather, jolts are an easily observable correlate of cleaner fish cheating (Bshary, &
Grutter, 2002a). Note that only non-predatory clients (i.e. species that could not eat
cleaner fish) jolt on a regular basis, while jolts of predatory clients are infrequent
(Bshary, 2001). Therefore, we will only present data on non-predatory clients. In
response to a jolt, clients often dart off or chase the cleaner, depending on their
strategic options. Client species with large home ranges that cover several cleaning
stations (‘choosy clients’) usually make use of their choice options and swim off
and visit a different cleaning station for their next inspection (Bshary & Scha¨ffer,
2002), as predicted by biological market theory (Noe¨ et al., 1991; reviewed by Noe¨,
2001). In contrast, client species with small territories or home ranges, and hence
with access to only one cleaning station (‘resident clients’),tend to punish cleaners
by chasing them (Bshary & Grutter, 2002a). Both darting off and punishment could
readily provide bystanders with the information that a cleaning service was bad.
In contrast, if an observed interaction ends without apparent conflict, then the
service had probably been good. Therefore, clients could easily attribute an image
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score to a cleaner fish, and cleaners could adjust their behaviour to the presence
of eavesdropping potential clients.
Why should clients attribute an image score to cleaners?
Attributing an image score to an individual and basing behavioural de-
cisions during interactions with that individual on that score only makes sense
if the score has some predictive power about how that individual will behave.
In potentially cooperative interactions, a positive image score is attributed to an
individual only if cooperation on one occasion is usually followed by cooperation
on the next occasion. In the context of cleaning symbiosis, this implies that there
must be consistent variation in cheating rates either between individual cleaners
or within individual cleaners. Indeed, Bshary (2002) found that a minority of clean-
ers cheated more frequently than the rest. These ‘biting cleaners’, compared with
normal cleaners, specifically targeted larger non-predatory clients, both residents
(median client jolt rate was 12/100 seconds in interactions with biting cleaners
compared with 2/100 seconds in interactions with normal cleaners) and choosy
clients (18/100 seconds compared with 3/100 seconds), while there was no evidence
for increased cheating of predatory clients (0/100 seconds compared with 0/100
seconds) or small resident clients (6/100 seconds compared with 6/100 seconds)
(Bshary, 2002). These data suggest that it would pay larger non-predatory clients
to avoid interactions with such biting cleaners. One way they could do this is
to extract information from ongoing interactions and attribute an image to a
cleaner.
There is another reason why constant image scoring of cleaner behaviour is
advantageous for clients. Data from one biting cleaner fish revealed that cheating
rates changed considerably over a period of six weeks. Some of the 99% confi-
dence intervals around observed daily jolt rates of choosy clients did not overlap,
suggesting that the variation is significant (Fig. 22.1). This individual was a female,
as were all other biting cleaners that have been observed (n = 7). Cheating of non-
predatory choosy clients peaked at the two periods of full moon that occurred
during the observation period, and full moon coincided with repeated spawning
with her male partner. After the second spawning period, the male disappeared
and cheating rates fell to very low values. The cleaner wrasse is a protogynous
hermaphrodite; that is, individuals start their reproductive career as females and
eventually switch sex to become males (Robertson, 1972). Males have a larger repro-
ductive output because they often have a harem. Therefore, females face a trade-off
between investing in current reproductive effort through the production of eggs
and investing in growth to become a male. If the energy requirements for egg
production are maximal close to spawning, females needed extra energy in order
to avoid compromising growth too much. We suggest that the females’ switch to a
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Fig. 22.1. Jolt rates (with 99% confidence intervals) of choosy clients (species with large
home ranges that cover several cleaning stations) when interacting with one
particular female cleaner on nine different days, based on one hour of observations
on each day.
temporarily deceptive strategy yields short-term energetic advantages. In aquaria,
clients jolt more frequently when interacting with hungry cleaners that when in-
teracting with satiated cleaners (A. S. Grutter, unpublished data). The benefits of
cheating, therefore, seem to be condition dependent, and the client control mech-
anisms like punishment (Bshary & Grutter, 2002a) and partner switching (Bshary
& Scha¨ffer, 2002) only work most of the time.
It even appears that the same individual can switch back and forth between a
cooperative and a biting strategy within seconds. Another biting female, observed
over a six-week period, cheated clients frequently during the spawning period
but client jolt levels remained high after that. Her male partner tolerated her
presence at his cleaning station only during spawning but not thereafter and
chased her off repeatedly. The female spent about equal amounts of time at her
own cleaning station on the other side of the reef patch and on excursions to
the male’s cleaning station. When the female was at the male’s cleaning station,
her resident and choosy clients jolted significantly more frequently than when
interacting with the female at her own cleaning station (residents (n = 8): t = 1.5;
p = 0.021; choosy clients (n = 7): t = 0; p = 0.016; Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-
ranks tests; Fig. 22.2). The variation both within and between cleaners apparent
from these examples means that client image scoring is a profitable strategy to
avoid (temporarily) cheating cleaners.
Do clients attribute image scores to cleaners?
As shown elsewhere (Bshary, 2002), clients use information about the out-
come of ongoing interactions when visiting a cleaning station. To appreciate fully
what is happening, it is important to note that clients usually do not ‘hang out’ at
cleaning stations but visit them only when they seek an inspection by a cleaner.
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Fig. 22.2. Jolt rates (medians and interquartile ranges) of eight resident species (clients
without choice; n = 8) and seven client species with choice (defined in text; n = 7)
during interactions with one particular female cleaner depending on the location of
the interaction (at her own station (•) or at the male’s station (); see text for further
details).
Therefore, clients can gather information on how cleaners treat other clients only
when they visit the station themselves and only if a cleaner is busy inspecting
another client while they approach. So visiting clients can base their decision to
invite inspection on current information only if they can observe another client
being inspected. The newly arrived individual can attribute a positive image score
to the cleaner if the current interaction ends without apparent conflict and a
negative image score if the current interaction ends with the client darting off
or chasing the cleaner. If another client is not present when the client arrives,
no current information is available and the image score might be neutral. This is
what the data suggest. If an ongoing interaction ended without apparent conflict,
clients that had arrived during the interaction invited inspection by the cleaner in
almost 100% of observed interactions. In contrast, if the interaction ended with an
apparent conflict, clients hardly ever invited inspection (Bshary, 2002). When no
information about a cleaner’s previous interaction was available, clients invited
inspection with intermediate probability and the actual outcome of the previous
interaction (that was unobserved by the client) had no significant effect. When
clients do not invite inspection, they often exhibit an ambiguous response; they
let the cleaner approach and inspect but do not stop coordinated swimming move-
ments before the interaction starts (they may stop afterwards). They may also flee
from the approaching cleaner. Fleeing most often results in no inspection and fre-
quently happens when clients are approached immediately after an interaction
has ended with a conflict. In contrast, fleeing hardly ever occurs after a positive
interaction had just ended or if the previous interaction had ended a while ago
(Fig. 22.3). These observations are consistent with the statement above that clients
only visit cleaning stations to seek an inspection. The decision to invite inspection
is only altered if they observe a negative interaction.
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Fig. 22.3. The frequency of fleeing (accelerating away from approaching cleaners) by
resident client species (•) and choosy client species (defined in text, ) arriving at a
cleaning station in four different situations: the previous interaction ended either ≤
5 s or ≤ 5 s ago and had positive (without conflict) or negative (with conflict)
outcomes. Values are median and interquartile ranges. The letters b and b′ above the
values for fleeing in the situation where the previous interaction had ended
negatively ≤ 5 s ago indicate a significant difference to the other three situations,
which are not statistically significant between each other, as indicated by using the
same letters a and a′.
Response of ‘normal’ cleaner fish to image-scoring clients
If clients attribute image scores to cleaners, one would expect that clean-
ers adjust their behaviour and cheat current clients less frequently if bystanders
are present than when no bystanders are present. Such audience effects should
be particularly common if bystanders have access to several cleaning stations, as
these species (see above) might not only delay their interaction with the cleaner
but also swim to another cleaning station. Resident bystanders can only delay
their interaction or avoid interactions altogether and remain uncleaned. To look
for such effects, we assumed that all individuals within 50 cm of cleaner–client
interactions at the beginning and at the end of each interaction were able to
collect information about the ongoing interaction and all individuals ≥ 10 cm
total length were potential next clients. We quantified the number of all such
individuals and their species identity for 12 cleaners. For each client species and
cleaner station, we calculated correlations between the frequency of jolts and the
number of bystanders. We distinguished four classes of bystander; conspecific, het-
erospecific, resident species and choosy species. We only calculated correlations
for observations where only one of these classes of bystander was present. For each
client species and bystander category, we compared the number of positive and
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Fig. 22.4. The influence of the presence (within 50 cm at the beginning and the end of
an interaction) of four bystander classes on the jolt rate of clients during interactions
with cleaners. The histograms show the number of client species for which the
correlation between jolt rate and the number of bystanders of a category was either
negative (black) or positive (white).
negative correlations and scored a plus if the majority was positive and a minus
if the majority was negative. Thus, we had one data point for each client species
and bystander category and evaluated any significant impacts of bystander cat-
egories on client jolt rates using sign tests. We did not find a significant effect
of conspecific bystanders on client jolt rates (n = 13; x = 6; NS) while the pres-
ence of heterospecific bystanders had a significantly negative effect (n = 23; x = 6;
p = 0.034; Fig. 22.4). The effect of heterospecific bystanders was mainly owing to
choosy bystanders (n = 17; x = 1; p < 0.001) while resident bystanders did not have
a significant effect on client jolt rates (n = 15; x = 6; NS; Fig. 22.4).
While the data presented above are in line with the hypothesis that client image
scoring influences cleaner fish behaviour, there is an alternative explanation. It
could be that when more clients are present it is easier for cleaners to pick the few
obvious parasites from each of them and the reduction in client jolt rate is a result
of an optimal foraging decision of cleaners rather than caused by bystander image
scoring. In favour of the optimal foraging interpretation, it is known that choosy
clients are, on average, larger than resident clients (Bshary 2001), which could
explain the stronger effect of their presence on the current clients’ jolt rates than
the smaller residents. However, optimal foraging cannot explain our observation
that choosy bystanders have different effects on cleaner fish behaviour, depending
on whether they are the same species as the interacting client or whether they are
a different species. We can explore this effect further by considering only inter-
actions in which individuals of one choosy species, the sergeant major Abudefduf
vaigiensis, were bystanders. We picked 13 cleaning stations for data collection on
the basis that these clients were frequent visitors. Sergeant majors may visit as
single individuals or as large shoals of 20–50 individuals. For 11 out of 12 client
species, we found more negative than positive correlations between the number
of sergeant majors present and client jolt rates (sign test: n = 12; x = 1; p < 0.01).
This result is the opposite of the effects of sergeant major bystanders on the jolt
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Fig. 22.5. The influence of the number of sergeant major Abudefduf vaigiensis
bystanders present (within 50 cm at the beginning and the end of an interaction) on
the jolt rate of the sergeant major client.
rates of sergeant major being cleaned: in comparison to interactions in which no
bystanders were present, small numbers of bystanders did not have any detectable
effect and the presence of large numbers led to an increase in jolt rates (Friedman
test: n = 12; χ2 = 9.9; df = 2; p < 0.01; Fig. 22.5).
Response of biting cleaners to image scoring clients
Biting cleaners have more interactions that end with a conflict and clients
approaching their cleaning station more often avoid them than normal cleaners
(Bshary, 2002). As explained above, it seems likely that the latter observation is the
result of client image scoring rather than previous direct experience of clients.
Do biting cleaners still have some means to improve their image? In this respect,
it is important to note that biting cleaners behave very differently from normal
cleaners, not only with respect to jolt rates of large clients but also with respect to
their behaviour towards small resident clients. Biting cleaners often ride above the
small residents’dorsal area and provide tactile stimulation with their pectoral and
pelvic fins. While this behaviour is part of every cleaner’s repertoire, about 50% of
the interactions between biting cleaners and small residents consisted of tactile
stimulation only (Bshary, 2002). Providing tactile stimulation is incompatible with
foraging; hence interactions that consist of tactile stimulation only are clearly
costly to cleaners. Usually, cleaners provide tactile stimulation in response to the
behaviour of the client; for example, manipulating clients that are unwilling to
interact. The manipulation serves to slow down the clients, allowing the cleaners
to forage on the clients’ surface (Bshary & Wu¨rth, 2001). As tactile stimulation of
small residents did not appear to provide the cleaners with any direct benefits from
the recipients, Bshary (2002) proposed that it may serve as a signal to attract image-
scoring clients, which can then be exploited. In line with this argument, it was
found that interactions that consisted of tactile stimulation only were followed
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Fig. 22.6. Frequencies with which biting and normal cleaners ignored the invitations
for inspection of small resident clients. Values are the median and interquartile
ranges for five biting and eleven normal cleaners. (Mann–Whitney U-test: for p value;
see text.)
by interactions ending with a conflict immediately after a client jolt more often
than expected. It appears that tactile stimulation of small residents is a signal out
of context that attracts image-scoring clients to their own disadvantage (they will
be cheated) and to the cleaners’ advantage, fulfilling the functional definition of
tactical deception (Hauser, 1998).
The presence or absence of bystanders was not noted, so it remains unclear
whether biting cleaners seek small residents in particular when larger clients are
nearby or whether they start such interactions independently of the presence of
bystanders. The latter scenario is more plausible, as larger clients, in particular the
choosy ones, are not willing to queue for inspection (Bshary & Scha¨ffer, 2002) and
would, therefore, swim off despite the cleaner’spositive image. So, cleaners appear
unable to time interactions with small residents for maximal effects. However,
some evidence suggests that tactile stimulation of small residents is part of biting
cleaners’ strategies to improve their image. Cleaner fish sometimes ignore clients
that invite inspection, in particular small resident clients (Bshary & Wu¨rth, 2001).
These clients do not offer a large food source and do not have the option to visit
another cleaner if ignored. When approached by small residents, biting cleaners
ignore them significantly less frequently than normal cleaners (Mann-Whitney
U-test: n = 11; m = 5; U = 2; p = 0.004; Fig. 22.6).
Discussion
We have provided a description of behavioural patterns in interactions
between cleaner fish and client reef fish that emphasizes the importance of the
communication-network framework in understanding the dynamics of coopera-
tive interactions and the occurrence of tactical deception. Cleaning interactions
often occur in the presence of other potential clients of cleaners. These bystanders
eavesdrop on ongoing interactions, and the information that they collect appears
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to be crucial for their decision to invite inspection or to avoid the cleaner. In
response, it appears that normal cleaners reduce cheating frequencies in the pres-
ence of eavesdroppers, in particular if these eavesdroppers have access to several
cleaning stations. Data of this kind are still missing for biting cleaners. Biting clean-
ers frequently engage in costly (or at least non-profit) interactions with small res-
idents that appear to serve to attract larger image-scoring clients, which can then
be exploited. The results have important implications for theoretical approaches
to indirect reciprocity. Existing models predict that image scoring drives altruistic
behaviour towards fixation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Lotem et al., 1999; Leimar
& Hammerstein, 2001). Cheating individuals can only reinvade an image-scoring
population after genetic drift has led to an increase in non-discriminatory altru-
ists. This scenario does not fit the cleaner fish mutualism very well. Image scoring
of clients mediates cooperative behaviour of cleaners, but this cooperative be-
haviour may be an honest or a deceptive signal. Cheating individual cleaners use
one class of clients for altruistic behaviour to produce a signal that allows them
to exploit, through image scoring, another class of clients. Image scoring thus
works for the receiver of altruistic behaviour but it does not always work for the
eavesdropper.
The major difference between the cleaner fish system and the models might
concern the payoff matrix. While it is assumed in the models that payoffs are the
same in every interaction, payoffs are variable for cleaners. First, an advantage
of cheating clients with access to several cleaning stations rather than resident
clients is that the former just swim off after being cheated, while the latter chase
the cleaner fish around (Bshary & Grutter, 2002a), so the cleaner loses some of the
energy it has just gained. Second, cleaners can probably gain very little from in-
teractions with small clients anyway, no matter whether they cooperate or cheat.
This contrasts with interactions with large clients, which have more parasites but
also more mucus and a larger surface for the cleaner to scrape along with its lower
jaw. This gives the opportunity for cleaners to behave altruistically when payoffs
are low and to be exploitative when payoffs are high, as long as the altruism in-
creases the frequency of high payoff interactions. Image scoring would not persist
if it did not yield a benefit to its performer, but it also provides an opportunity
for individuals to perform altruistic acts in order to gain access to and exploit
image-scoring individuals. Therefore, image scoring in communication networks
may explain both the evolution of altruistic behaviour and the occurrence of
tactical deception. The commonness of dishonest signals that nevertheless still
fool observers has yet to be evaluated. While verbal arguments predicted low fre-
quencies (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978), game theoretic models indicate that this is
not necessarily the case (Johnstone & Grafen, 1993; Szamado, 2000). In particu-
lar, if the benefits of finding a cooperative partner largely outweigh the cost of
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interacting with a cheating partner, tactical deception may occur at quite high
frequencies.
Future work with the cleaner system
Several important points of the cleaner fish symbiosis still have to be
clarified. First, we need experimental evidence for both client image scoring and
cleaner fish audience effects. There is increasing evidence that a reduction in client
jolt rates in the presence of bystanders reflects a more cooperative behaviour by
cleaners (Bshary & Grutter, 2002b) and that such behaviour is indeed more al-
truistic. A. S. Grutter & R. Bshary (unpublished data) offered cleaners the choice
between equal amounts of mucus, gnathiid isopods and monogeneans attached
to plexiglas plates and found that cleaners ate mucus more often than parasites,
in particular gnathiids. Assuming that the results reflect the items’ quality as a
food source, cleaners profit even more from feeding on mucus when interacting
with real clients as mucus is abundantly spread over the clients’ surface whereas
parasites have to be searched for. In conclusion, while the experiment did not
quantify energy intake, it makes it very plausible that feeding on mucus yields
a higher energy gain than feeding on parasites. Another point that needs to be
addressed is the biting cleaners’ behaviour with respect to small and large clients.
Is it really true that interactions with small clients generally offer low payoffs
compared with interactions with larger clients, and that the margin between the
benefits from cooperation and cheating increase with client size? Does image
scoring of clients indeed inhibit the cleaners’ tendency to cheat in low-payoff in-
teractions but not in high-payoff interactions? Currently, no data are available to
evaluate these questions. Finally, one might expect that clients should respond
to the biting cleaners’ behaviour by fine-tuning their image scoring, paying less
attention to the outcome of interactions between cleaners and small residents.
Pooling of existing data indicate that this is indeed the case. Invitation for in-
spection (i.e. spreading the pectoral fins and stopping coordinated swimming
movements) occurred more frequently if cleaners interacted with choosy clients
than with small residents. This preliminary result has to be tested with a larger
data set that allows statistical analysis based on behaviour of individual client
species.
Cognitive aspects
While indirect reciprocity and tactical deception were considered to be
a hallmark of human evolution (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) and primate Machi-
avellian intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988), the data on cleaner–client interac-
tions suggest that, on a purely descriptive level ignoring underlying mechanisms,
these phenomena are more widespread. We have argued that they should occur
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frequently in social networks. These phenomena should occur if it pays to alter
the optimal behaviour in a situation in order to alter one’s image, which will, in
turn, produce benefits during future interactions with bystanders that exceed the
momentary costs. With respect to aggression, a game theoretic model shows that
it may even pay individuals to act spitefully towards a partner (in the sense that
the spiteful act will not lead to any benefits gained from future behaviour of
the recipient) if this spiteful act reduces, for example, the threat of attack from
bystanders (Johnstone & Bshary, 2004; Ch. 10).
With respect to cognition, the data generally support the view of Heyes (1998)
that we need to establish what kind of information animals use for their decision
making to find out what cognitive abilities are involved in a given phenomenon. In-
direct reciprocity and tactical deception may be something ‘smart’in some species
and simple conditioning in others. Cleaners certainly have ideal conditions to de-
velop their behaviour through conditioning. They have more than 2000 interac-
tions per day (Grutter, 1995), making it easy to connect altruistic behaviour with
reward (i.e. the invitation from bystanders to inspect) and cheating with punish-
ment (i.e. evasive actions of bystanders when approached by the cleaner). In the
absence of decisive experiments, it could even be possible that parts of cleaner
fish and client behaviour may be governed by endocrine responses rather than
through learning (Ch. 21). A good candidate for an endocrine-mediated behaviour
might be the good service that cleaners provide to predatory clients: there might
be an innate programme to recognize predators, and the presence of a predator
might trigger a stress response that, in turn, may inhibit cheating behaviour. Al-
ternatively, one could also generalize the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis
and predict that a complex social network should have similar effects on cogni-
tive abilities in all species (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). It may turn out that cleaners
have relatively high cognitive abilities, as their large interspecific social network
is at least in part based on individual recognition (Tebbich et al., 2002) and de-
mands the solving of a variety of problems (Bshary et al., 2002). In this context,
it is worth pointing out that both the biting females which were observed over
longer time periods showed considerable variation in their behaviour, as so did
their male partners. One male often prevented his female from interacting with
clients while the other did not (Fisher test: n = 34; p = 0.003; Table 22.1). The
preventive male was also almost significantly more likely to chase his female
when their client darted off after a jolt, while the other male often followed the
client to provide tactile stimulation (Fisher test: n = 12; p = 0.053; Table 22.1).
This observation of flexibility of both males and females is important as it was the
careful description of individual-specific strategies in primates that eventually
led to a cognitive, rather than genetic, approach towards behaviour (Strum et al.,
1998).
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Table 22.1. The behaviour of two males that were partners of biting
females
Male responses to female biting
Tactile Preventative
stimulation Chasing No obvious chasing of
of clienta femalea reactiona femaleb
First male 5 2 3 1
Second male 0 5 2 16
a Reaction to clients darting off following cheating by female.
b Keeping female away from clients.
Summary
In summary, we think that the concept of communication networks has
major implications for our understanding of the evolution and maintenance of
altruistic behaviour, tactical deception and spiteful behaviour. Because of its func-
tional approach, the communication-network framework may help to demystify
phenomena that are often considered to demand high cognitive abilities, opening
the way to focus on the underlying mechanisms and the complexity of information
processing and decision rules in order to illuminate cognitive differences between
species (for a parallel discussion, see Ch. 24). Game theory models should help to
generate testable predictions of the circumstances in which altruism, tactical de-
ception and spiteful behaviour may yield fitness benefits within communication
networks. In particular, it is time to develop cognitive models rather than genetic
models, allowing individuals to process information about their social environ-
ment before making a behavioural decision (see Stephens & Clements (1998) for a
first approach towards cognitive game theory).
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